This paper presents a dynamic multi-equation model based on a balance sheet identity, where technical aspects of capital structure are highlighted through separately observing debt and equity and their relationship to investment. Additionally, leverage dynamics are interpreted in their role for liquidity management. Interactions of leverage with lines of credit (LOC) and cash are considered in the light of nancial exibility. The major ndings obtained by observing US REITs and REOCs from 1995 to 2010 are as follows. In accordance with the existing literature, cash and LOC reveal a substitute relationship. However, the calculus of nancial exibility and our ndings suggest that leverage positively drives cash, which is consistent with Gamba and Triantis (2008), and also with the accepted perspective of debt minus cash being net debt (Spotlight A). Consequently, the very robust results indicate that leverage eliminates a signicant amount of information. Further mechanical relationships, especially for market leverage, are suggested (Spotlight B). JEL Classication Codes: G32, G33, G35
Introduction
The persistently large number of capital structure studies since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) does not yield consistent evidence for one specic capital structure theory. This study does not aim to validate any of these theories, but follows Graham and Harvey (2001) , who state that nancial exibility is the single most important determinant of capital structure according to CFOs. Investigating rm cash holdings, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) argues: Firms want to avoid situations where the agency costs of debt are so high that they cannot raise funds to nance their activities and invest in valuable projects. Obviously, one way to do so is to choose a low level of leverage. A more recent example of this stream of research is the proposal of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) , aimed at lling the gap in capital structure theory and the associated empirical ndings. They state: Financial Flexibility is the critical missing link for an empirically viable [capital structure] theory. Gamba and Triantis (2008) directly address this concept and provide the following denition: Financial exibility represents the ability of a rm to access and restructure its nancing at a low cost. Financially exible rms are able to avoid nancial distress in the face of negative shocks, and to readily fund investment when protable opportunities arise.
In the present study, approximation leverage (LEV) is investigated by two spotlights.
Financial exibility, in the sense of anticipating liquidity management, is addressed by Spotlight A. Interactions of LEV with cash & cash equivalents (CCE) and lines of credit (LOC) form the focus. The more technical one (Spotlight B) is motivated by the arguments of Chen and Zhao (2007) and Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) . Spotlight B ensures robust results, distinguishing between real stochastic and mainly mechanical relationships.
The recent late-2000s nancial crisis in particular, provides the motivation for investigating Spotlight A. There is consensus in the existing literature on a substitute relationship between CCE and LOC. This is due to the fact that LOC hedge against underinvestment, and CCE against cash ow (CF) shortfalls (Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) ). However, what was evident immediately after the peak of the crisis is that rms draw their available LOC, fearing that they will be canceled due to covenant breaks (Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) ). Su (2009) also supports the view that CCE and LOC are only conditional substitutes. Therefore, this study aims to ll the gap in the literature, by including LEV in the interactions of sources of liquidity management.
Furthermore, another issue of the late-2000s nancial crisis is the perceived increased relevance of the real estate industry. Many studies argue that there is homogeneity in the REIT industry due to legislation, e.g. aspects such as the role of taxes or retained cash ows are of lower relevance. Hence, more consistent ndings are expected when concentrating on REITs. Another interesting circumstance within this industry is the underutilization of CCE, as opposed to a similar level of importance of LOC, compared to companies outside the real estate industry. This may be due to the fact that the high dividend payout restriction prevents REITs from accumulating cash. Yet, recent research by Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) reports that REITs voluntarily choose to pay 'excess dividends' up to 38% of their total assets. This paper is organized traditionally. Section 2 provides an overview of the related literature. In section 3, the data are described. Section 4 introduces our model. In section 5, we present the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
General Motivation
At rst, both the general nance literature, as well as real estate studies, seem to reach no empirically robust consensus on classical capital structure theories. One could cautiously claim that recent research in this eld agrees on a mixture of trade-o and market-timing theory as valid. This is justied mainly by market timing allowing equity issuances to be preferable in some states of the economy.
1 Furthermore, LEV often reveals a meanreversion characteristic; hence, target-leverage is interpreted as a validation of the tradeo theory (Flannery and Rangan (2006) ).
Hence, the second argument is motivated by Chen and Zhao (2007) , who demonstrate, using the sample of Flannery and Rangan (2006) , how their ndings can be justied by a purely mechanical characteristic. This is due to the fact that leverage is 'just' a ratio and has insucient implications for capital structure dynamics, thus making it an inadequate tool for distinguishing between dierent nancing policies.
The third argument is based on the relevance of taxes to nancing decisions, if one argues in favor of the trade-o theory. Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) investigate the widespread belief in the underutilization of debt. This is supported indirectly by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) . They do not exclude a tax-shield, but emphasize that preserving debt capacity, in order to forego investment distortions in the near future, outweighs the few cents on the dollar benet of debt. Finally, the present study observes mainly REITs, which are pass-through entities with respect to the main business activities. Hence, a tax-shield is assumed to be of no relevance for this paper. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) recognize the dilemma of capital structure research and formulate a draft aimed at lling the gap between the traditional theories and empirical ndings. They argue that it is the 'equity as the last resort' attribute of the pecking-order theory, and the 'non-occurrence of levering up after stock price increases' of market-timing, and the 'high dividend-low leverage' characteristic of protable rms of trade-o theory which necessitate innovations in this eld of research. Their alternative approach to explaining capital structure is based on interpreting management actions in the light of nancial exibility, e.g. preserving debt capacity for facilitating potential future nancial needs.
1 For this reason, pecking-order is often rejected, but seems to be valid for large rms with low marketto-book-ratio but high cash-ows (Leary and Roberts (2010) ).
The above mentioned arguments motivate focusing on leverage with two spotlights: from the one perspective, leverage is 'just' a ratio, which absorbs valuable information by denition. From the other perspective, as a ratio, leverage is one source of liquidity management; hence, it competes with other sources of nancial exibility. The rst spotlight can be seen as the more technical one, while the second may be interpreted rather as an alternative approach to solving the capital structure puzzle.
2 The following section briey summarizes recent research relevant to these two spotlights.
Spotlight A: Leverage, Cash & Cash Equivalents and Lines of Credit
There is a wide range of literature on CCE versus LOC, generally agreeing that these sources may be assumed to constitute substitutes.
3 Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) accord dierent purposes to CCE and LOC, with respect to the state of the economy. They argue that LOC serve to nance value-raising projects when they arise, while CCE hedge against CF shortfalls. Su (2009) investigates the dependence of rm characteristics on the use of one or the other source. High CF-generating rms maintain LOC, because of the strong link between nancial covenants and credit facilities. Su also argues that the unavailability of LOC is a superior proxy for being nancially constrained (for rms with a high degree of information asymmetry see also An, Hardin, and Wu (2010) ). Accordingly, a positive CF-CCE sensitivity would only prevail for constrained rms, which do not have a LOC. Interpreting LOC as the nominal amount of debt capacity (see also Riddiough and Wu (2009) ), Su (2009) highlights the relevance of cash ow and debt measures for credit agreements. With cash ow decreases being associated with covenant violations, CCE is only a conditional substitute for LOC. Hardin, Higheld, Hill, and 2 Because much is said about capital structure theories, namely trade-o, pecking-order and markettiming theory, we forego the reproduction and refer to Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007) , Hardin and Wu (2010) or Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) for the real estate market or Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) or Flannery and Rangan (2006) for the general nance literature. authors state that REIT managers choose not to accumulate cash, preferring to nance externally, gaining from reduced agency conicts of monitoring and reduced costs ofnancing.
While empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship between LEV and CCE (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) ; Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) ; Hardin, Higheld, Hill, and Kelly (2009) ), our perspective suggests a positive, but non-linear relationship. This becomes clear when considering the insurance aspects of both instruments: low leverage preserves debt capacity, i.e. the ability to borrow in the future, high cash reserves hedge against the risk of underinvestment and cash ow shortfalls, but mainly against the latter. This view is supported by Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) , who nd no signicant (contemporaneous) relationship, but refer to argument which we have just stated. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) also favor the hedging argument of CCE for underinvestment, but predict a negative correlation of LEV and CCE. Gamba and Triantis (2008) investigate a rm's nancial exibility, driven by levels of borrowing and lending. By controlling cash and debt, the resulting positive net debt implicates a higher rm value, although with a decreasing marginal eect with respect to the mixture of cash and debt.
4 Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) also argue that CCE constitutes negative debt. Their implications are dependent on varying degrees of hedging needs, namely a lower risk of underinvestment implicating that rms pay down their outstanding debt.
Moreover, a negative relationship between LEV and LOC seems to be empirically robust, as well as consistent with the calculus of nancial exibility. Riddiough and Wu (2009) declare that REITs increased dividend payout in the 1990 to 2003 period, leaving these specic companies with lower cash reserves than non-REITs, whereas the use of LOC is comparable. Therefore, interpreting a high LEV as the inability to borrow in the 4 Hill, Kelly, and Hardin (2010) report a $1.34 increase ($0.30 decrease) of rm value due to a $1 increase of CCE (one standard deviation increase of unused LOC) based on empirical investigation of REITs.
future (e.g. Gamba and Triantes 2008) and hence classied as the reciprocal of debt capacity LEV and LOC yield reverse dynamics. Second, LEV accounts for drawing LOC and the change of other external sources of nance. Third, since the dynamics between LEV and CCE, as well as LOC, have not been comprehensively empirically investigated, the stochastic properties of the variables of interest would allow at least the following prediction. Assuming that CCE and LOC are not independent of each other, namely negative, a reverse relationship of LEV applies to each of them. Assuming positive CCE-LEV dynamics, the hypothesized sign of LEV and LOC follows technically.
Summarizing the arguments of Spotlight A, the liquidity sources have dierent tasks, but are dependent on rm characteristics, as well as the state of the economy. Moreover, a preference for one or the other may depend on the original level.
Spotlight B: Leverage is 'just' a Ratio
The second spotlight on leverage takes properties of this ratio into account. If equity and debt increase by the same percentage, a leverage ratio will simply cancel out these dynamics, but total (i.e. non-current) assets increase. The relative position of debt still plays a signicant role in terms of anticipative liquidity policy, but in order to dierentiate between nancial actions, debt and equity must be treated separately.
Today's decisions are determined jointly, they are dependent on what happened in the past and also inuence the (unknown) future. Therefore, the rst imperative, when dealing with nancial exibility is dynamic modeling. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) distinguish between debt and equity, and do so between all the main aggregates from the cash-ow statement one example of a more cash-ow-focused mentality since the late-2000s nancial crisis. The authors detect a much lower sensitivity of investment to shocks to cash ows, concluding that nancing sensitivity with respect to cash ows is much more relevant than investment responses. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) dene an identity where one dollar cash in-ow corresponds exactly to one dollar cash outow. Chen and Zhao (2007) also worked with an accounting identity in which assets are dened by last year's assets plus the change in debt, equity and retained earnings.
The authors suggest that rms levered below the median increase leverage by increasing debt, but highly levered rms increase equity while decreasing debt. Almeida and Campello (2007) also investigate nancing-investment sensitivities with respect to the state of the market and rm characteristics. They agree that cash-ow shocks aect primarily constrained rms. However, the portion of tangible assets in particular, determines the procyclical aspect of debt capacity with respect to the business cycle.
In summary, the importance of distinguishing between the numerator and denominator of LEV is the focus of the second spotlight on LEV. In addition to research surrounding LEV, CCE and LOC, the relevance of real assets (investment) and cash ow is determined. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) 
Research Goal from a Bird's Eye
In a perfect world, there is no need to hoard cash or hedge in any other way, because rms have access to the capital market at any time without transactions costs, when investment opportunities arrive. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) dene a rm as being short of liquid assets, if it has to sell assets or cut capital expenditures or dividends. By contrast, this paper considers how, dependent on the state of the economy and rm characteristics, investment funding is inuenced by the drivers of nancial exibility, namely debt capacity (reciprocal LEV), CCE and LOC. However, we adjust the concept of assuming an optimum amount of 'nancial exibility'. The marginal costs of being short of money in periods when a rm would actually need funding are a decreasing function with respect to instruments of nancial exibility. On the other hand, foregoing borrowing power in terms of LEV (on balance, but not directly measurable in terms of being nancially constrained), the opportunity costs of CCE (on balance and fully measurable) and fees for the availability of LOC (o balance and partly measurable in terms of eciency) act in a contrary manner, so as to antagonize these marginal costs.
Therefore, there has to be an optimum where the marginal costs of underinvestment and nancial distress coincide with the costs associated with being nancially exible. Despite the fact that CCE plays a minor role for real estate companies, this is an unconditional source for hedging underinvestment, if outside investors are unwilling to provide funds.
Yet, cash hedges particularly eectively in economic downturns, since a low-leverage rm would still be dependent on external capital. LOC agreements could be canceled in the event of covenant breaks. However, of the three sources, CCE is associated most strongly with costs of asymmetric information, because outsiders doubt the appropriate use by managers, while debt has the advantage of monitoring (Hardin, Higheld, Hill, and Kelly (2009) From this perspective, the objective function describes the ability to secure sucient nancial resources and to raise sucient nancial resources to implement protable investments with respect to uncertainty and the eciency constraint in terms of the direct and indirect costs of nancial exibility. We hypothesize that nancial exibility is a broader, but more consistent concept in explaining the dynamics of nancing activities, compared to traditional capital structure theory.
Data
The SEC statements compiled by SNL Financial are the basis of our panel data set.
The initial sample contains 316 operating and acquired or defunct US Equity REITs and REOCs traded on the NYSE, NYSE Amex Equities and NASDAQ from 1996 to 2010, with 56% non-missing values. Company foundations and liquidations are responsible for 79% of the missing values, whereas 21% are due to unreported data. The broad announcements of cash ow statements in SNL from 1996 onwards, as well as the dynamic modeling, including lagged dierences, restrict the sample to the 1998-2010 period and eliminate 36 rms with less than three consecutive years. Research on cash balances suggests the need to scale variables by non-cash assets, in order to forego mechanical relationships (see Su (2009) ), analogous to the arguments associated with Spotlight B. However, since debt scaled by assets (leverage) would decrease after CCE scaled by non-cash assets has increased for mechanical reasons, we scale 6 A further reason for starting in 1996 is the beginning of a consolidation phase, after a boom of the REIT sector in the 1990s. variables with the beginning of the period value of total assets, rather than divide the variables by non-cash-and-debt assets.
(Balance Sheet) Items Dening the Identity
The variables STD for short-term debt, and LTD for long-term debt, describe the liabilities of the company to a third party, whereas EQU for common equity, describes the claims of the shareholders. DPROP for depreciable property is calculated as the sum of property, plant and equipment (PPE) and accumulated depreciation. The dierences between DPROP over time characterize the net expenditures of the company in PPE.
In line with Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) , real estate investment, as the source of collateral and asset tangibility, should increase the debt capacity of a rm. However, from our point of view, net property (real estate) investment foregoes the link of internal nancing through depreciation.
7 Hence, approximating the change in xed assets by DPROP does not dilute the actual stock of real estate. Apart from minor aggregates, the sum of operating, investment and nancing cash ow is the change in CCE and completes the identity, which is introduced in detail in the next section.
Instruments of Liquidity Management
The following sources are dened as the instruments of liquidity management. Cash & cash equivalents (CCE) describe the potential of the internal nance source for future projects and increase the rm's nancial exibility. By contrast, market leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets and lowers a rm's debt capacity.
While market LEV is used throughout the analysis, the results are also compared to book LEV, which is total debt to year-beginning total assets. The available lines of credit (LOC) are a revolving debt source extended by a bank. On the one hand, they oer future nancial exibility for the rm, but on the other hand, they are subject to fees for the unused lines.
Traditional Capital Structure Determinants
The following determinants are typical control variables used in capital structure studies.
The general (stock) market cycles inuence the development of real estate rms with respect to systematic risks and opportunities. This impact is incurred through the continuous returns of the S&P500. The market-to-book ratio (MB), calculated by market equity divided by book equity, characterizes the idiosyncratic growth opportunity.
8 The protability of a rm measured by return on assets (ROA) may also inuence the capital structure, as it is easier to issue debt and equity for more protable rms. The size of a rm is captured by the natural logarithm of its total assets, assuming decreasing marginal economies of scale. With respect to balance sheet aggregates, a mechanical size eect on DPROP, STD, LTD and EQU is mitigated, due to scaling by total assets. depreciation for internal funding
Additional Dummies Approximating Firm Characteristics
The dummy Rating has a value of one, if the rm has at least an investment grade longterm issuer rating from S&P, Moody's or Fitch. It approximates access to the public debt market, due to relatively lower transaction costs and levels of asymmetric information.
The dummy Op_Risk equals one, if the volatility of operating CF exceeds the conditional median of the twelve dierent property segments. It approximates the operational risk confronting a real estate company.
The two remaining dummies are unique to our research. As derived in the literature section, it is of interest to determine whether a rm faces strong investment opportunities or substantial CF shortfalls. Therefore, the Inv_Shock variable summarizes all observa- 
Dealing with Cross-Industry Variation
It is common in real estate nance to allow for varying intercepts for dierent property segments. However, Ertugrul and Giambona (2011) show that the relative standing of a rm within its property focus segment (micro industry) is essential for determining leverage. The rationale behind this approach is simply that it is not appropriate to compare protability, leverage, or, as in this study, dierent forms of hedging tools of e.g. an oce with a residential property company. Table ( 2) contains the t-statistics of Welch's t-test for the sources of liquidity across property segments. The results of the t-test, whether the segment means are equal to the sample mean, indicate that 10 of 21 conditional means are signicantly dierent to the overall sample mean. Furthermore, subsamples are constructed for the boom years (1996-1999, 2003-2007 and 2009-2010) , bust years (2000-2002 and 2008 ) and for the sample before the late-2000s nancial crisis (before 2008). Moreover, the attributes of whether a rm 'is rated as investment grade', 'has an above-median cash ow volatility' or 'experienced positive as opposed to negative cash-ow changes' are identied accordingly.
Model
The concept underlying this paper is basically that of combining the cash ow statement approach of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) with the balance-sheet view of Chen and Zhao (2007) .
More specically, the ideas that we adopt are a system of equations, estimated by weighted least squares, where the weight is reciprocal to the number of observations per year. By also following the advice of Petersen (2009) , the methodological dierence, is that we decided to include year dummies in order to account for time eects.
9 An even more important dierence is that we do not need to de-ne our identity, but eliminate 48 rm-year observations which do not satisfy the conditions in equations (1) and (2).
10
Cash F low f rom Operations i,t
Through equation (1), we relate the operating cash ow (CF_Op) to changes in balance sheet items by modeling
9 Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) demeaned their variables by the year means, which is associated with a manual adjustment of condence intervals (especially in smaller samples like ours). Accordingly, after demeaning our sample, the year dummies re-main jointly signicant.
10 Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) did not capture the whole cash-ow statement and thus had to dene this identity in combination with a penalty function.
where:
The rst two summands of equation (2) expresses the change in total assets, while the second row expresses the change in equity plus liabilities of the variables in our focus.
The change in Resid(All) subsumes the remaining aggregates of the balance sheet.
11
Moreover, we allow for a maximum deviation of $100,000 in equation (2) |error i,t | ! < 100, 000
Therefore, the basic model accounting for Spotlight B can be written as 11 The sum of nancing and investment cash ow was originally allocated to the change in Resid(All), which should only play a minor role for the system dynamics. However, the dynamics of this variable were too often signicant, due to the substantial relevance of these two cash ows.
or in compact form
'Y' represents all the right hand side variables of equation (2) 13 By construction, it follows that all coecients per row add up to zero, but the operating CF's impact on 'Y' sum to one.
12 Besides Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) , the funding cycle of Brown and Riddiough (2003) in conjunction with Riddiough and Wu (2009) would also suggest this dynamic framework. (3). STD refers to short-term debt, LTD to long-term debt, EQU to common equity, DPROP to depreciable property, NFI to the net of the nancing and investment cash ow, Resid(All) subsumes all remaining balance sheet items as dened in equation (2), all measured in rst dierences and scaled by year-beginning total assets. CF_Op refers to operating cash ow scaled by year-beginning total assets. S&P500 refers to the continuous return of the S&P500 index, MB to the ratio of market value over book value of equity, ROA to return on assets, Size to the ln of total assets. The dummy Rating is equal to one, if a rm has an investment grade rating, Op_Risk is equal to one, if a rm's cash ows are above the median in the respective property segment, Inv_Shock is equal to one, if a rm's percentage change in MB is above the 55 th percentile in the respective property segment, FFO_Shock is equal to one, if a rm's percentage change of FFO is below the 45 th percentile in the respective property segment, and zero otherwise. Year dummies are not reported. N denotes rm-year observations of each equation, N_cluster denotes the number of observed rms, Mean(y) and St.Dev.(y) represent mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable. The last column illustrates the accounting identity dened in equation (2). T-stats are in parenthesis, ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This is basically the modeling aspect of emphasizing leverage. Liquidity management is essential in modeling nancing decisions. Therefore, the other spotlight highlights the debt ratio from interactions with competing sources of nancial exibility, namely CCE and LOC. Therefore, the full model adds LEV, CCE and LOC to equation (3). The quadratic terms of these three sources are also implemented, since no previous study has so far explored potential non-linear relationships between LEV, CCE and LOC. In the manner, interactions between the three instruments of nancial exibility are dependent on the original level, which is the main reason for the quadratic terms (i.e. Su 2007, for LOC and CCE or Gamba and Triantis (2008) , for cash and debt).
where
Finally, we challenge equation (4) with respect to three dierent 'sets' of conditions.
The rst simply splits our sample in economic up-and downturns, as well as the subsample before the recent late 2000s nancial crisis. Second, rather than interpreting rm characteristics typically used in capital structure research (MB, ROA and Size), we compare subsamples with low and high levels for these variables of interest. The same is done for the sources of nancial exibility, in order to take a further look at how relationships are dependent on the original level (rankings are dened according to the respective property focus, see data section). In addition, subsamples are compared with respect to Rating, Op_Risk and the change in CF_Op.
This section is also separated in Spotlight A and Spotlight B and all conditional subsamples are considered. However, only full sample and conditional estimations with respect to time and MB, ROA and Size, as well as LEV, CCE and LOC are reported. 14 5.1 Spotlight A
In the literature section, it was pointed out that the negative LOC-CCE interactions seem to be empirically robust. Across the 22 subsamples, we nd a robust negative (non-linear) relationship for CCE on LOC, but only six subsamples reveal reverse causality.
The literature section did not provide a robust prediction of how LEV ts into the dynamics of this discussion. Initially, LEV yields contrary interactions with LOC. If signicant, the 'negative' causality runs from LEV to LOC and only for the squared terms (14/22 subsamples). Furthermore, we nd four negative (four positive) impacts of LOC on LEV, most obviously for the subsamples low (high) CCE and low (high) LOC rms.
This could simply be due to the chronology of the funding cycle of Riddiough and Wu (2009) . If LEV increases due to the use of LOC, then a negative relationship follows technically. Alternatively, if debt decreases due to the repayment of outstanding debt, the next funding cycle is established by blowing up LOC. On the other hand, if LOC increases, it is not clear when the rm draws these lines. Moreover, the LOC-LEV interactions are exclusively the case for the squared terms (except for small rms).
Second, LEV-CCE interactions are much weaker. LEV positively drives CCE in 6/22 subsamples, which is also restricted to the squared terms. In contrast, CCE negatively impacts on LEV in 3/22 sub-samples. This is the case for the high LOC and high CCE rms, as well as for rms with high CF volatility. A reason for this might be that on the one hand, having a reasonable amount of one of these two sources, the marginal value of lowering debt as the third source increases. On the other hand, high CCE or 14 All estimations are, as always, available on request.
LOC subsamples imply that these rms are able to aord a drop in nancial exibility by lowering CCE, accompanied by an increase in debt. In the case of rms with highly volatile cash ows, we argue that CCE will be used before debt increases, in the event of a CF shortfall. Accordingly, both instruments will be 'reloaded' (more CCE, less debt) after positive movements from the CF mean.
In short, in four of the six subsamples, in which LEV is signicant with respect to CCE, LEV is also signicant for LOC. Alternatively, the relationship of LEV on CCE (LOC) is always positive (negative). If signicant, CCE on LEV is always negative and in these subsamples, LOC on LEV is always positively signicant. Hence, the above stochastic argument of a reverse relationship of CCE and LOC on LEV and vice versa holds for each of the 22 subsamples. This can be observed directly in the sub-samples high CCE, high LOC and high Op_Risk.
Before discussing the remaining variables, four ndings are highlighted. First, the expected strong, empirical, negative relationship of LOC and CCE is reduced to a causality from CCE to LOC. Second, causality also seems to be stronger for LEV on LOC and for LEV on CCE, compared to the reverse causalities. Third, the nancial exibility perspective provides the basis for a complementary relationship of CCE and LEV and a substitutive one of CCE and LOC. Finally, the dependence on the original level of one or the other source is strongly suggested by a dominance of signicant squared terms. Also, the change in signs of signicant relationships in the case of LOC on LEV, dependent on low/high CCE or LOC rms, clearly demonstrate the importance of the original level.
It was expected that CF would positively aect LOC (Su (2009) 17 There is some additional discussion with respect to the shock dummies in the section on the mechanical aspects of leverage.
Spotlight B
The interpretation of Spotlight B is reduced to the discussion of LTD, EQU, DPROP and LEV.
18
First of all, the motivating aspects described above are addressed by investigating how often there is an impact on LTD or EQU, but LEV is unaected and vice versa.
For this reason, we employ two approaches. On the one hand, we follow the suggestion of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) by interpreting the number of signicant estimators in rows of matrix Γ of equation (5) With respect to Size, we rarely nd signicant eects, since we scaled by the yearbeginning total as-sets. As stated above, a negative relationship of Size is evidently the case for LEV. MB positively (negatively) impacts LTD (EQU) and hence yields a signi-17 One exception is that Inv_Shock shows a positive sign to LEV before the late-2000s nancial crisis.
18 However, worth mentioning is the fact that the sum of nancing and investment CF shows the most considerable signicances in our system. Hence, ndings of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) that these two 'activities' would balance each other so that nancing-investment sensitivities are mitigated cannot be stated for the real estate market. Moreover, aspects of debt maturity as suggested by Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008) or Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) are simply modeled, though not reported, by distinguishing between short and long term debt.
19 Assuming persistence in accounting variables, we ignore signicances of lagged dependent variables.
When we include lagged dependent variable, it is leverage, of course, which shows the highest persistence, since it is not measured in rst dierences (LTD 19, EQU 29, and LEV 42) . Dependent variables with more responses are also said to be shock absorbers (Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) ).
cantly negative sign to LEV, moreover, rarely it aects DPROP positively. In accordance with the arguments relating to the mechanical aspects, a negative MB-LEV relationship may be attributed to market valuation, which is in the numerator of MB, but in the denominator of LEV. Analogously, this is assumed to be valid for EQU.
Finally, ROA positively (negatively) drives EQU (LTD and LEV) which was expected. However, a negative impact of 'protability' on DPROP can again be attributed either to mechanics (median depreciable property accounts for 96% of total assets, which is the denominator of ROA) or is a further illustration of cash ows being a superior measure of a company's soundness.
CF strictly shows positive impacts on LTD, EQU and DPROP and does not aect LEV, apart from the 'bust-subsample'. The most impressive instance is the very high magnitude of estimates of CF for these three variables. While a $1 increase in operating cash ow robustly leads EQU to increase within a range of $0.35 to $0.66, estimators of LTD are between $0.27 (low Size) and a much higher $1.37 (low Op_Risk). DPROP is aected between $1.01 (low LEV) to $2.80 (during Bust) by a $1.00 increase of CF.
These results suggest that rms use the improvement in cash-ow-based credit-quality ratios due to cash-ow increases and acquire more debt. Taking the full sample estimation as a benchmark, for each subsample, it can be stated that the higher the CF-LTD sensitivity the higher the CF-DPROP sensitivity.
In order to understand this, recall the identity of equation (3). Assume also that
Resid(All) and STD play a minor role, and further assume that a $1 change in operating CF transfers to a $1 change in the sum of nancing and investment CF whereas EQU is very robustly aected by about $0.52 (whole sample). A strong connection between LTD and DPROP caused by operating CF then follows logical-ly.
Accordingly, S&P500 also positively inuences all variables considered, but positive drivers of nancial decisions, since an investment shock seems to aect balance sheet changes similarly to an FFO shock, but the inference for LEV yields reverse dynamics.
Book Leverage
While MB yields a negative relationship to market LEV, it turns into a positively significant one for book LEV. Since it was argued that the negative correlation results from a mechanical relationship, one would rely on book LEV. However, consider two identically characterized rms with dierent market valuations. The higher valued rm would certainly have better access to nancing sources. Yet, would a rm that is not otherwise constrained be interested in this? The calculus of nancial exibility would refute such behavior. Indeed, we nd no signicant results for most of the 'good' subsamples (high LOC, high ROA, high Size, rated rms and low Op_Risk). Most surprisingly, the Inv_Shock dummy does not change its sign, even though it is less often signicant (9 for book versus 19 for market LEV). In line with the original motivation for this approximation, it is signicantly negative, especially for nancially inexible rms. On the one hand, one might see this as a further indication of the interactions of the three sources suggested in this paper being valid. On the other hand, it is evident that especially rms that are nancially constrained and/or are confronted with potential underinvestment preserve debt capacity.
A further important dierence is that book leverage is very sensitive to CF. aect balance sheet aggregates very similarly to investment shocks, but generally result in leverage increases. This highlights the need to identify drivers of nancial decisions, since an investment shock seems to aect balance sheet changes similarly to an FFO shock, but the inference for leverage yields reverse dynamics. (5) Note: This table shows results based on equation (5). LTD to long-term debt, EQU to common equity, DPROP to depreciable property, all measured in rst dierences and scaled by year-beginning total assets. LEV refers to market leverage, CF_Op refers to operating cash ow, all scaled by year-beginning total assets. S&P500 refers to the continuous return of the S&P500 index, MB to the ratio of market value over book value of equity, ROA to return on assets, Size to the ln of total assets. 
